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CHAPTER 17 
Land Use Law 
RICHARD G. HUBER 
A. ZONING 
§17.1. Special permits: Site plan approval. Municipalities are 
recognizing that flexibility is required in zoning, and that although 
the standard Euclidean type of zoning can provide an adequate zoning 
base, it cannot handle the multiplicity of cases that aJrise within a 
community. The major reliance on the variance as a device to alter 
zoning regulations has passed, at least in this Commonwealth, because 
the standards for the grant of a variance are very narrow and the 
courts in recent years have been carefully enforcing them.l The amend-
ing process, although necessary in cases involving substantial changes, 
takes considerable time and, under the Zoning Enabling Act, often 
proves difficult.2 The special permit device has thus developed as 
the tool by which communities can control development quite simply 
and with considerable flexibility. The increasing use of the device 
has naturally resulted in a rapid increase in the number of cases 
involving what occasionally become quite sophisticated variations 
of the original rather simple permit. 
One variation of the special permit has been site plan approval. 
Under this type of ordinance or by-law, the permit can be issued only 
if the development of the tract meets the standards set out in the 
zoning regulations to the satisfaction of the local body that is dele-
gated this responsibility. Standards are set not merely in terms of 
specific factors but often in terms of the zoning purposes and goals 
of the municipality within the district in which the permit is autho-
rized. Site plan approval also underlies the concepts of duster zoning 
and planned unit developments which will become increasingly im-
portant as our urban populations increase rapidly over the next 
decades. Despite the not uncommon use of site plan approval in 
local ordinances and by-laws, however, it was only during the 1970 
RICHARD G. HuBER is the Dean of Boston College Law School. 
§17.1. 1 G.L., c. 40A, §15(3); see discussions in 1969 Ann. Surv. :Mass. Law §14.7; 
1956 id. §§1.2, 13.2. 
2 G.L., c. 40A, §7. Requirements of public hearings and a more than majority 
vote for an amendment create a substantial part of the problem. Of course, al-
terations in zoning also disappoint the expectations of those who have depended 
on the zoning pattern, and this factor must be considered in determining if the 
rezoning is constitutionally valid. See 1968 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §12.2. 
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SURVEY year that the Supreme Judicial Court sustained this type of 
permit. 
In Y. D. Dugout, Inc. v. Board of Appeals of Canton,s the board had 
refused to grant site plan approval, under its local by-laws, to a pro-
posed use of a lot for a new commercial building. Local zoning per-
mitted the restaurant use of the proposed building as of right in the 
district, but required site plan approval for the construction or ex-
ternal enlargement of a commercial building. Standards set out in the 
by-law required the board, consistent with a reasonable use of the 
premises for permitted purposes, to consider the protection of the 
neighbors, feasibility of the proposed use in connection with traffic 
and safety, the solution of water drainage and sewerage problems and 
provision for any necessary loading areas. 
Dugout owned an adjoining smaller building where it was presently 
conducting its business, about which neighbors had complained in the 
past, and which contributed to serious traffic congestion on the 
adjoining street. The board, in acting upon the site plan request, 
found that the congestion would be increased and that protection of 
the neighborhood from noise, loud music and drunkards would not 
be adequate. Thus the site plan was disapproved. 
On an appeal by Dugout, the Superior Court ruled, in setting aside 
the board's decision, that the site plan approval provisions of the 
Canton by-law could not properly be enacted under the Zoning Ena-
bling Act. The Supreme Judicial Court reversed, upholding site plan 
approval provisions of the type represented by this by-law. The Court 
pointed out that Canton could have, in effect, zoned the present locus 
for residence and could have had a provision allowing commercial 
use upon application for a special permit, thus making all nonresi-
dential use a matter of special permit. This type of arrangement, 
subject to the requirement of adequate standards, would be the stan-
dard type of special permit. The Court thus concluded that the by-law 
could be interpreted as stating the general rules for commercial 
buildings and uses, and as allowing a permit for commercial build-
ing construction to be granted only upon the board's determination 
of compliance with the other pertinent provisions of the by-laws. 
Reasonably flexible means of adjusting zoning in accordance with 
sufficiently stated standards have been upheld. The Court found the 
present by-law, in substance, similar to those sustained in earlier 
cases under Sections 2 and 4 of the Zoning Enabling Act, stating that 
matters of substance as well as of form are to be considered.4 
This decision does not, of course, broadly approve all site plan ap-
proval legislation, but its emphasis on substance rather than form 
should assure that the device will be available as an excellent, intelli-
gent and effective way of regulatory development. The rather obvious 
3 1970 Mass. Adv. Sh. 201, 255 N.E.2d 732. 
4 Id. at 206, 255 N.E.2d at 736. 
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willingness of the Court to support this type of control willl encourage 
municipalities to proceed with confidence in developing flexibility 
within the somewhat rigid zoning patterns. 
Although the Court upheld the Canton by-law, it d:id not allow 
the board's original decision to stand. Quoting the by-law, the Court 
noted that the provisions were designed to protect the public interest 
and that this suggested regulation rather than prohibition. At the 
least, the Court concluded, on the facts of the present case, the site 
plan approval provisions were designed to allow only the imposition 
of reasonable conditions. The case thus went back to the board for 
reconsideration. The language of the Court, however, does not sug-
gest that it is limiting its rather broad support of site plan approval, 
since its determination of this point involved interpretation of the 
local Canton by-law. 
§17.2. Special pennits: Discretion to deny. In MacGibbon v. 
Board of Appeals of Duxbury1 the Supreme Judicial Court for the 
second time considered the validity of the board's denial to the plain-
tiff of a special permit to fill and excavate certain shore lots. Mac-
Gibbon's original request to the board had been denied on the basis 
that "'[the plaintiffs] have presented no evidence that ... [their] 
land could, in fact, be filled and used for residential purposes without 
constituting a hazard to the health of the community.' "2 The Superior 
Court held that this original decision of the board did not exceed its 
authority, but the Supreme Judicial Court reversed because the denial 
of the permit was not responsive to the petition. The Court had con-
cluded that "[i]n so far as the permit is sought for the purpose of 
filling and excavating land, it ought not to be denied on the basis 
that the land is unsuitable for residential construction ... .''3 On re-
mand to the board of appeals, the plaintiff limited his request to 
one-seventh of the land included in the original petition and supplied 
engineering reports showing the feasibility of the landfill project. The 
board of appeals again denied the permit, this time basing its decision 
primarily on a 1960 amendment to the Duxbury zoning by-laws.4 The 
Superior Court held that the board's decision was within its authority, 
and again the plaintiff appealed from the decree. 
The basic thrust of the town's argument was twofold, positing first 
that the courts should not try to second-guess the town as to the ex-
pediency or purpose of its zoning by-laws, and second, that the town 
§17.2. 11970 Mass. Adv. Sh. 81, 255 N.E.2d 347. 
2 MacGibbon v. Board of Appeals of Duxbury, 347 Mass. 690, 691, 200 N.E.2d 
254, 255 (1964). 
3 Id. at 692, 200 N.E.2d at 251i, noted in 1964 Ann. Surv. Mass. l.aw §14.2. 
4 The provision added was as follows: " ... [The by-law] is also for the purpose 
of protecting and preserving from despoilation the natural features and resources 
of the town, such as salt marshes, wetlands, brooks and ponds. No obstruction of 
streams or tidal rivers and no excavation or filling of any marsh,. wetland or bog 
shall be done without proper authorization by a special permit issued by the 
Board of Appeals." 1970 Mass. Adv. Sh. 81, 82, 255 N.E.2d 347, 349. 
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is not required to grant special permits, which are, in any case, dis-
cretionary. This argument was supported by the decision in Gulf Oil 
Corp. v. Board of Appeals of Framingham/> wherein the Supreme Ju-
dicial Court reversed a Superior Court decree that had been based 
upon the finding that the granting of a permit would ",'confer a 
substantial benefit to the public.' " 6 The Court thus restored the hold-
ing of the board denying the permit. In its opinion, the Court stressed 
that the board is not compelled to grant a permit because of its dis-
cretionary power.7 This argument is further supported by Section 4 
of the Zoning Enabling Act,s and by the Duxbury zoning by-laws, as 
was noted by the Court in the instant case.9 
The plaintiff in MacGibbon argued that the zoning by-law wa~ 
invalid because the amendment was overly vague in that it did not 
state sufficient standards to govern the decisions of the board. More 
crucial to his contention was his argument that the board did not 
comply with the Supreme Judicial Court's directive in the original 
appeal, wherein the Court stated that "the facts relevant to the denial 
of the plaintiffs' petition to excavate and fill must be stated."10 Lastly, 
it was argued that the denial of the permit constituted a taking of the 
land without just compensation. 
In its opinion, the Court found first that the amendment in ques-
tion was not overly vague, stating: "We do not think that greater 
particularity is required. The standards for the guidance of the board 
are adequate."11 As to the town's argument that the granting of this 
special permit was discretionary and therefore not mandatory, how-
ever, the Court disagreed and reversed, giving four reasons for its 
decision. First, and apparently most decisive, the board had not found 
any "additional or different findings relevant to the proposed exca-
vating and filling ... .'' The Court flatly stated: "The purpose for 
which we recommitted the case to the board has not been accom-
plished. The case must go back to the board again for compliance 
with our directive.''12 
Second, the board had ruled that the escape clause13 of the by-law 
5 355 Mass. 275, 244 N.E.2d 311 (1969), noted in 1969 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §14.5. 
6 Id. at 276, 244 N.E.2d at 312. 
7 Id. at 277, 244 N.E.2d at 313. 
s G.L., c. 40A, §4, provides in relevant part: "The board of appeals ... may, in 
appropriate cases and subject to appropriate conditions and safeguards, grant to 
an applicant a special permit to make use of his land or to erect and maintain 
buildings or other structures thereon in accordance with such an exception." 
(Emphasis added.) 
9 1970 Mass. Adv. Sh. 81, 84, 255 N.E.2d 347, 350. 
10 347 Mass. 690, 692, 200 N.E.2d 254, 256 (1964). 
11 1970 Mass. Adv. Sh. 81, 84, 255 N.E.2d 347, 350. 
12 Id. at 85, 255 N.E.2d at 351. This decision might have been prompted by the 
fact that there was testimony to the effect that the board had made up its mind 
and prepared a written statement prior to a supposedly public hearing. Record 
at 25-26. 
13 "No obstruction of streams or tidal rivers and no excavation or filling of any 
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was intended to apply only to inland areas and that there was no 
permissible exception for a coastal marsh. The court di:,agreed with 
this interpretation and held that the board had sufficient authority to 
grant a special permit for any marshland, be it large or ~.mall, inland 
or coastal. 
Third, according to the Court's interpretation of the Duxbury by-
law, it is the town's policy to allow special permits for excavating or 
filling inland and coastal wetlands, and the board, by i(s interpreta-
tion, was trying to circumvent the town's own policy "at least as to 
coastal wetlands."14 It was noted that the zoning by-law was an at-
tempt to preserve the coastal wetlands in their natural state, which 
is beyond the scope of the authority delegated to the municipalities 
under the Zoning Enabling Act,15 at least if it is the sole purpose of 
the board's decision. 
Fourth, in response to the contention that since the zoning by-law 
deprived the plaintiff's land of all practical value, it therefore 
amounted to a taking without compensation, the Court made no 
decision since the case was being remanded to the board on other 
grounds. There was a broad suggestion, however, that such an argu-
ment might find considerable support if the case reached the Court at 
another time, depending "in part on the board's further action on 
the plaintiffs' application for the special permit."16 
§ 17 .3. Special permits: Separate licenses required. The special 
permit for an exception, as a zoning device, does not carry with it 
any commitment that other licenses and permits required for the 
permitted use will be forthcoming. This rule was applied during 
the 1970 SURVEY year in Davidson v. Board of Selectmen of Duxbury.1 
The petitioner had obtained a special permit from the town's board 
of appeals to construct a gasoline service station at a particular lo-
cation, but the selectmen denied him a license for the storage and 
sale of gasoline at the situs. The selectmen denied the application due 
to the existence of such factors as a very congested street, the hazards 
created by a large nearby parking lot, the probable building of a 
central post office in the area, and the objections of nearby residents. 
Upon petition for certiorari, the Superior Court ordered the issuance 
of the license. The Supreme Judicial Court reversed this decision 
and dismissed the petition. 
The majority of the Court first determined that the denial of the 
license was proper under standards set out under G.L., c. 148, §13, and 
marsh, wetland or bog shall be done without proper authorization by a special 
permit issued by the Board of Appeals." 1970 Mass. Adv. Sh. 81, 85, 255 N.E.2d 
347, 351. 
14 Id. at 86, 255 N.E.2d at 351. 
15 G.L., c. 40A. 
16 1970 Mass. Adv. Sh. 81, 87, 255 N.E.2d 347, 352. 
~17.3. 11970 Mass. Adv. Sh. ll73, 260 N.E.2d 695. 
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the local by-law. Precedent indicates that the licensing authority can 
consider factors other than fire and explosion danger, including 
heavy traffic conditions.2 The majority thus found that the decision 
of the selectmen in this case cannot be considered arbitrary and 
capricious, as held by the Superior Court, at least as divorced from 
the zoning decision granting the special permit. 
The Court, in its analysis of the licensing statute3 and the Zoning 
Enabling Act,t found that they were not so intertwined as to make a 
decision of the board of appeals on the zoning matter binding upon 
the selectmen in considering the licensing request. Independent de-
cisions were to be reached on the evidence before each board, and 
the evidence itself, even if it concerned the same matters, might not 
be the same at both of the public hearings held before the respective 
decisions were reached. Thus the majority concluded that principles 
of res judicata, collateral estoppel, and "law of the case" would not 
apply to bar the licensing denial. It should be noted that Chief Justice 
Wilkins and Justice Reardon dissented without opinion. 
In a literal sense, the majority of the Court read the statutes cor-
rectly. The troublesome fact remains, however, that the result is that 
one arm of the local government has successfully prevented action 
permitted by another, and on grounds that were directly relevant and 
necessarily considered in the granting of the original special permit. 
The solution may have to be legislative rather than judicial, but a 
solution is clearly required. The so-called Anti-Snob Zoning Act of 
1969 provides for a single hearing and a comprehensive permit to 
cover all licenses and permits required for the construction of low 
and moderate income housing.5 All arms of the local government 
whose functions are thus being taken over by the board of appeals, 
however, have the right to appear and present their arguments and 
expertise to help guide the decision-making agency. This type of 
model may be one that the General Court might wish to use in all 
cases in which both zoning and other permits are required. One can-
not discount the value of the doctrine of separation of powers and 
the desirability of some governmental conflicts as a device to prevent 
any one unit of government from dominating the others. But, in 
turn, this problem seems minor at the local level in a context such as 
that of the present case. No one, except perhaps some oil companies, 
will be disturbed that another filling station cannot be built in Dux-
bury. The fact remains, however, that the selectmen have, by use of 
their licensing power, successfully overruled the board of appeals after 
hearing basically the same evidence. Such a power will tend to un-
dermine the use of special permits, which, according to most planners 
2 Sherman v. Board of Selectmen of Orleans, 355 Mass. 786, 243 N.E.2d 816. 
3 G.L., c. 148, §1!1. 
4 G.L., c. 40A. 
5 G.L., c. 40B, §21. 
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today, offer the best means of maintaining the necessary flexibility in 
zoning practice. 
§17.4. Special permits: Variation of dimensional 1requirements. 
Adams v. Board of Appeals of Concord1 involved a rather typical use 
of the special permit to authorize multi-family housing in single-
family districts. The town enacted legislation requiring a lot of at 
least 10,000 square feet and 80-foot frontage for each dwelling. The 
by-law also authorized, upon various requirements and permission 
by the board of appeals, the erection of garden apartments in certain 
districts, limiting the minimum lot size to 3500 square feet and leaving 
the frontage requirement to the discretion of the board. 1n the instant 
case, the board approved the development of five gard~~n apartment 
buildings. The Superior Court's decision dismissing an appeal by an 
adjacent landowner was affirmed by the Supreme Judicial Court. 
The Court noted that the proposed garden apartmt~nt buildings 
would not conform to the regulations of the district in which they were 
to be located, if that section of the by-law were the only one control-
ling. It found, however, that the special permit section fully em-
powered the board to authorize the apartment buildings. The reduced 
frontage, although substantially less than what would otherwise be 
required, was permitted by the by-law provision itself. The Court 
also found that the Subdivision Control Law2 did not apply under 
the zoning by-law provision.s 
This case is most notable for its total acceptance of a zoning regula-
tion that permits, under certain circumstances, mixed housing in a 
zoning district. At a time when only about 30 percent of the popula-
tion can afford newly constructed single-family homes, the spread 
of various types of multi-family housing into many single-family 
zoned communities will prove impossible to resist. Fine and flexible 
tools are needed to assure the successful integration of this type of 
housing into these communities. The special permit is one excellent 
method by which effective and intelligent planning of this change can 
be accomplished. 
§17.5. Special permits: Discretion to grant. The award of a spe-
cial permit is discretionary with the granting authority, under the 
holding of Gulf Oil Corp. v. Board of Appeals of Framingham.1 In 
the 1970 SURVEY year, this rule was decisive in Zaltman v. Board of 
Appeals of Stoneham.2 The petitioner sought a permit to build a 
§17.4. 11970 Mass. Adv. Sh. 167, 255 N.E.2d 372. 
2 G.L., c. 41, §§81K-81GG. 
3 The Court noted that the definition of lot in G.L., c.41, §81L, el,empted the lo-
cus from the Subdivision Control Law on the basis that it complied with the 
statutory definition of a single lot not subject to this law. 
§17.5. 1 !155 Mass. 275, 244 N.E.2d !Ill (1969), noted in 1969 A111n. Surv. Mass. 
Law §14.5. 
2 1970 Mass. Adv. Sh. 755, 258 N.E.2d 565. 
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convalescent home on certain land, part of which was zoned so that 
it could not be used for this purpose. However, a section of the town 
by-law authorized the board to grant permission to extend a use from 
a district in which it was permitted up to 50 feet into a district in 
which it would be otherwise prohibited. Standards for the board re-
quired that, in exercising its judgment, it find that such permission 
would substantially serve the public welfare or that it would not 
substantially injure neighboring property. 
The board denied the petitioner's request on the ground that a 
grant would not substantially serve the public interest and that the 
proposed use was not the most appropriate for this area. Upon appeal, 
the Superior Court upheld this decision as an exercise of the discre-
tionary power given the board. This discretionary power was deemed 
dispositive even though the judge found (l) that a similar permit 
was awarded several weeks later to a landowner on the opposite side 
of the street and (2) that, because of underlying rock conditions, the 
proposed convalescent home could be built much less expensively on 
the proposed site than if it were built fully within that section of the 
lot where it was permitted as of right. 
The petitioner's appeal to the Supreme Judicial Court was also 
rejected. The discretionary nature of the grant was controlling. Un-
der the by-law, the failure to prove by evidence or by reasons in the 
board's opinion that the permit was not in the public interest was in 
no way determinative. The board's decision was specifically stated as 
being subject to "its judgment." There was no evidence that the 
board exercised its judgment capriciously or upon a legally untenable 
ground. 
The present case is not unique in its holding, at least after the 
decision in Gulf Oil Corp. It does, however, point out one disadvantage 
that exists with much special permit legislation, namely that the dis-
cretion given is not carefully limited. Totally prescinding from argu-
ments about the necessity of fairly precise standards,3 the use of valid 
but indefinite standards does create situations in which litigation can 
readily arise. The decision in Zaltman points up the dear duty of 
attempting, insofar as language and concepts permit, to avoid the ap-
pearance of action taken for other than proper planning grounds. Sub-
sequent to the board's action on the instant plaintiff's application, a 
similar application was granted for a site near the one proposed by 
Zaltman. The present standards are perhaps expressed as precisely as 
they can be, but there may remain some doubt whether the basis of 
the Zaltman disposition was political rather than the standards stated 
in the by-law. 
§.17.6. Special permits: Municipal exemptions. The case of Sinn 
v. Board of Selectmen of Acton1 again raised the question o£ whether 
3 Clearly the present standards are not objectionable on this ground. 
§17.6. 11970 Mass. Adv. Sh. 917, 259 N.E.2d 557. 
8
Annual Survey of Massachusetts Law, Vol. 1970 [1970], Art. 20
http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/asml/vol1970/iss1/20
462 1970 ANNUAL SURVEY OF MASSACHUSETTS LAW §17.6 
a municipality may exempt itself from the provisions of its own zon-
ing ordinances. Under Acton's zoning by-law, all municipal uses are 
exempted from the use restrictions of the by·law, and Acton sought to 
enlarge its dumping area under this provision. The existing dumping 
area was· created prior to the adoption of the zoning by-laws and so 
was not subject to its provisions as a pre-existing nonconforming use. 
In 1969, however, Acton acquired some abutting land :and proposed 
to use it to expand the dump and to construct public works buildings, 
offices, and a parking lot in the area otherwize zoned for residential 
and agricultural use. The abutters objected to this proposal and 
sought to compel the selectmen to expunge the municipal exemption 
from the zoning by-laws, thereby rendering them able to achieve their 
purpose only by means of rezoning. 
The Supreme Judicial Court has held that a zoning by-law is valid 
if there is a substantial relationship between it and the general ob-
jectives of the Zoning Enabling Act, Chapter 40A of the General 
Laws.2 In the instant case, the Court indicated that it could not find 
that relationship to be lacking: "we cannot say that a broad exemption 
from use requirements for all municipal uses bears no substantial 
relation to [those] purposes.''3 The petitioners, on th«:: other hand, 
argued that municipal exemptions are permissible only if they are 
specific exceptions, citing Sellors v. Town of Concord4 and Pierce v. 
Town of Wellesley.li The Court disagreed, holding that a broad use 
exception rather than a specific one is permissible, given a rational 
relationship between the actual proposed use and the purposes of 
Chapter 40A. Here, the proposed use was dearly related to the 
town's health and welfare, especially since this was an expansion of 
the existing dump and not a new location for one. 
Petitioners' further argument that the exemption denied them 
equal protection was· dismissed, since the exemption applies uni-
formly to all districts of a· certain dass.6 All residential districts 
are subject to the presence of municipal uses-even though this par-
ticular use is located solely in the petitioners' district. 
In brief, the Court upheld "the exemption for all municipal uses 
for the particular use to which it is here applied. "7 (Emphasis 
added.) It thereby affirmed the validity of a broad municipal exemp-
2 Lanner v. Board of Appeals of Tewksbury, 348 Mass. 220, 202 N.E.2d 777 
(1964), noted in 1965 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §14.1; Cohen v. City of Lynn, 333 
Mass. 699, 132 N.E.2d 664 (1956), noted in. 195.6 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §1.2; Lundy 
v. Town of Wayland, !128 Mass. 581, I05 RE.2d !178 (1952). 
31970 Mass. Adv. Sh. 917, 919 259 N.E.2d·557, 559-560. 
4 329 Mass. 259, 107 N.E.2d 784 (1952). 
li3!16 Mass. 517, 146 N.E.2d 666 (1957), noted. in 1958 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §§11.1, 
14.2, 19.1. ' 
6 Sisters of the Holy Cross of Mass. v. Brookline, 347 Mass. 486, 198 N.E.2d 624 
(1964), noted in 1964 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §§ll.6, 14.5. See also Pierce v. Welles-
ley, 336 Mass. 517, 146 N.E.2d 666 (1957). 
71970 Mass. Adv. Sh. 917, 921, 259 N.E.2d 557, 561. 
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tion for unspecified uses, but left determination in a particular case 
to the relationship between the exemption and a permitted purpose 
under Chapter 40A. 
§17.7. Special permits: Nonconforming signs. Strazzulla v. Build· 
ing Inspector of Wellesley 1 raised the common, but nonetheless vex-
ing, question of the termination of nonconforming structures. In 
1963, Wellesley had amended its by-laws to regulate "accessory 
signs," defined as signs which indicate "the business transacted on 
the premises ... and which [contain J no other advertising matter."2 
Before the adoption of this by-law, the plaintiff sold his business to 
Wright, who relettered the sign to read "Wright's Laundry & Dry 
Cleaners." Subsequent to the adoption of the by-law, the plaintiff 
repossessed the business and sought a permit to reletter the sign to 
read "Linden Cleaners- Shirts- Laundry- Storage." The building 
inspector refused the permit since the by-law prohibited any altera-
tion of a nonconforming sign, which the sign in question now was. 
A special permit was also denied by the board of appeals, and the 
plaintiff sought relief in equity. Meanwhile, the plastic face of the 
sign was blown away, leaving the frame and wiring exposed, and 
plaintiff replaced it with the new lettering previously requested and 
refused. The Superior Court annulled decision of the board and 
held that the plaintiff was not in violation of the zoning by-law for 
having proceeded with his relettering. 
The by-law in question3 provided that nonconforming signs could 
be maintained, but could not be reworded or redesigned, and further 
provided that the exemption from the by-laws should terminate for 
any sign which had been abandoned. The intent of this by-law-
to ultimately eliminate nonconforming signs- is obvious. The ques-
tion was whether advertising on private property could be so severely 
restricted. Quite clearly such advertising can be regulated,4 and the 
General Court can delegate this authority to a municipality.5 
Furthermore, the Zoning Enabling Act6 specifically authorizes a 
municipality to "regulate non-use of non-conforming buildings and 
structures so as not to unduly prolong the life of non-conforming 
uses."7 (Emphasis added.) Accordingly, the Supreme Judicial Court 
reversed the opinion of the Superior Court and reinstated the deci-
sion of the board. 
Concerning the contention that the board acted arbitrarily in de-
nying the permit, the Supreme Judicial Court held that, since the 
§17.7. 1 1970 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1013, 260 N.E.2d 163. 
2 Id. at 1014 n.2, 260 N.E.2d at 165 n.2. 
3 §XXIIA of the zoning by-laws of Wellesley. 
4 Mass. Const. amend. 50; General Outdoor Advertising Co. v. Department of 
Public Works, 289 Mass. 149, 193 N.E. 799 (1935). 
5 Town of Milton v. Donnelly, 306 Mass. 451, 28 N.E.2d 438 (1940). 
6 G.L., c. 40A. . 
7 ld. §5. 
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board's power to grant a special permit is discretionary and not 
compelled, and since the refusal was based on the belief that the 
granting of the permit "would derogate from the general purpose 
and intent of ... the Zoning By-law,''8 the board's decision was not 
arbitrary nor capricious and was thus valid.9 
Outdoor signs have always tended to raise serious aesthetic ques-
tions among many people. The history of the validation of restrictions 
and bans of such signs is long and arduous. The courts have gone 
far beyond the question of whether regulation of sign1; is constitu-
tionally permissible, and it is instructive to note that this issue was no 
more than summarily considered by the Court in the present case. 
Once regulation of signs is recognized as valid, the usual balancing 
test of private loss against public gain is applied- and there is 
little private loss in the denial of a permit for a roof sign, particularly 
when other signs advertising the business are permissible on the site. 
§17.8. Floating use: Discretionary permit. In Senkarik v. Attor-
ney General} the town of Uxbridge had adopted an amendment to 
its zoning by-law that would grant to the board of appeals authority 
to permit the construction of apartment buildings anywhere in the 
community. The only guide for the board's action was that con-
sideration must be given to the effects of the permit of the neighbor-
hood and the town at large. The attorney general disapproved of the 
amendment on the ground that it authorized spot zoning.2 The peti-
tioner sought mandamus against the attorney general but was denied 
relief by the Superior Court. The Supreme Judicial Court found no 
error in the decision below. 
In the 1946 decision of Smith v. Board of Appeals oj' Fall River,3 
the Supreme Judicial Court invalidated discretionary power to in-
dulge in spot zoning granted to a board by a zoning ordinance. The 
Court in the instant case cited Smith, noting that it was the basis for 
the attorney general's disapproval of the amendment. An argument 
could be made that the present by-law did not, however, authorize 
"spot zoning" in the classic "amendment to zoning regulation" sense. 
The present procedure was a variation of the special permit device 
and, had it been more rationally applied and regulated by more 
effective standards, would have been valid. But the evil of the present 
by-law· is that it would permit what is in effect an amendment to the 
zoning by-law without following the required procedures for adoption 
of amendments.4 Since the board of appeals is not a legislative body, 
8 1970 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1013, 1016-1017, 260 N.E.2d 163, 166. 
9 See Gulf Oil Corp. v. Board of Appeals of Framingham, 355 Mass. 275, 244 
N.E.2d 311 (1969), noted in 1969 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §14.5. 
§17.8. 1 1970 Mass. Adv. Sh. 457, 257 N.E.2d 470. 
2 The attorney general acted under his authority in accordance with G.L., c.40, 
§32. 
B 319 Mass. 341, 65 N.E.2d 547 (1946). 
4 G.L., c. 40A, §7. 
11
Huber: Chapter 17: Land Use Law
Published by Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School, 1970
§17.9 LAND USE LAW 465 
its attempts to change the statute would necessarily result in a finding 
of improper delegation of legislative powers. It is thus not difficult 
to find several reasons, beyond the "spot zoning" objection, for de-
claring the present amendment invalid. But it is worthy of note that 
the town was at least recognizing the need for multi-family housing, 
a need many communities have failed to understand. It is to be hoped 
that the next attempt by Uxbridge will reach the desired objective 
by valid means. 
§17.9. Violation of zoning by-law: Removal of part of building. 
Town of Marblehead v. Deery1 grew out of a petition by the eventual 
defendant (Deery) to the selectmen as the town board of survey, seek-
ing approval of a private way (Sean's Way) in connection with a sub-
division plan. The plan was approved after appropriate notice and 
hearing; separate certificates of title were issued to the owners of the 
new lots; and sewer and other services were supplied for the new way. 
Deery's home, already on the land, was placed in the approved plan 
on a lot abutting on Sean's Way. Nearly five years later, and after 
Deery had done considerable renovation to that part of his home 
standing closest to the new way, the town building inspector, at the 
behest of the board of selectmen, gave him notice that since the house 
was only 8.55 feet from Sean's Way, it did not comply with the front 
yard requirements of the town's by-laws,2 which require 20 feet. The 
building inspector sought to have the offending part of the house re-
moved. 
The trial court found that the east side of the house was not the 
front entrance merely because it was the closest to a road or way. On 
the contrary, the judge found that both aesthetically and otherwise 
- the east door is below ground level and opens on a laundry room -
the main entrance had shifted from the north side to the south side of 
the house. Consequently, the front yard would be to the south facing 
also onto Sean's Way, and there would be no violation of the front 
yard requirement.3 
The trial court found further that the location of the house was 
the same as it had been under the former owners, and that the estab-
lishment of a private way "did not alter, reconstruct, or extend the 
dwelling structure."4 Since the zoning by-laws are not applicable to a 
pre-existing use,5 the court found that they were not applicable in 
this case. 
§17.9. 11969 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1443, 254 N.E.2d 234. 
2 Marblehead Zoning By-Laws §8 (1966). 
3 Report of material facts, rulings and order for decree. Record at 9. 
4 Record at 10. 
5 "[A] zoning ordinance or by-law or any amendment thereof shall not apply to 
existing buildings or structures, nor to the existing use of any building or struc-
ture, or of land to the extent to which it is used at the time of adoption of the 
ordinance or by-law, but it shall apply to any change of use thereof .... " G.L., 
c. 40A, §5. 
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As to the trial judge's finding that the front yard had moved to 
the south of the house, the Supreme Judicial Court stated: "We in-
terpret the by-law as intended to treat the front yard of a house as 
lying in the direction of the closest point of the way on which the 
owner's land abuts .... "6 This statement has support in the "Front 
Yards" statute: "In all residence districts no building shall be con-
structed or maintained within 20 feet of any street line .... " 7 But 
there may be a showing of a different legislative intent since the title 
of the section, Front Yards, becomes meaningless if the only definition 
of a front yard is that yard which lies closest to a street. The two 
cases cited in favor of the Court's position give definitions of other 
front yard or setback provisions, but do not lend strong support to its 
position on the intent of the provisions of the Marblehead by-law.8 
As to the trial judge's second finding- that the house was exempt 
from the by-law as a pre-existing use- the Supreme JUidicial Court 
found that the creation of the subdivision "materially changed the 
use of the premises to one now not in conformity_with the by-law. In 
1960 the use of the house was, and for some time had been, in con-
formity with the by-law. It was not a nonconforming use."9 On this 
point the Court clearly reached the correct decision, following its 
own relevant precedents in citing Howland v. Acting Superintendent 
of Bldgs. and Inspector of Bldgs. of Cambridge10 and Alley v. Building 
Inspector of Danvers.ll Each of these cases holds that subdivision 
changes the use of land and so removes it from the protection of the 
pre-existing use exemption. 
Despite its rejection of the findings of the trial court, the Supreme 
Judicial Court denied the injunctive relief sought by the town "on 
recognized equitable principles."12 Although these principles cannot 
include estoppel since a town cannot be estopped by the actions of its 
offi.cers,13 elements of the estoppel doctrine were present. The Court 
noted that Deery made "substantial expenditures on his house, and 
presumably on Sean's Way, in reliance on the 1960 dt~cision of the 
selectmen acting as a bo11rd of survey."14 Because of construction and 
conveyances, he could no longer change the location of Sean's Way to 
conform to th~ by-la;w. In addition to these factors, the Court also 
noted that all parties had acted in good faith, and that Deery had 
61969 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1443, 1447, 254 N.E.2d 234, 237. 
7 Marblehead Zoning By-Laws §8 (1966). 
8 Selectmen of Lancaster v. DeFelice, 352 Mass. 205, 224 N.E.2d 219 (1967); Scott 
v. Board of Appeal of Wellesley, 356 Mass. 159, 248 N.E.2d 281 (H169). 
9 1969 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1443, 1447, 254 N.E.2d 234, 237. 
10 328 Mass. 155, 102 N.E.2d 423 (1951). 
11 354 Mass. 6, 234 N.E.2d 879 (1968). 
12 1969 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1443, 1448, 254 N.E.2d 234, 238. 
13 Ferrante v. Board of Appeals of Northampton, 345 Mass. 158, 186 N.E.2d 471 
(1962); Cullen v. Building Inspector of North Attleborough, 351i Mass. 671, 234 
N.E.2d 727 (1968). 
14 1969 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1443, 1447, 254 N.E.2d 234, 237. 
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been without counsel and did not have the benefit of proceedings 
under the Subdivision Control Law (despite the fact that Marblehead 
has a population of greater than 10,000 and is required to create a 
planning board under that statute).15 Since the members of the 
board of survey were the selectmen who would have constituted the 
appeals board able to grant a variance, and since there was no show-
ing of public advantage to be gained by a rigid enforcement of the 
by-law, the Court allowed the house to remain intact. 
One may wonder whether this case does not represent a rather 
deserved reaction to Marblehead's refusal to adopt the more sophisti-
cated type of subdivision control possible under G.L., c. 41, §§81K-
8IGG. A more controlled procedure would have alerted the town as 
well as Deery to the failure of the lot to comply with the zoning by-
law, assuming that the front yard requirement is as interpreted by 
the Court. Despite the Court's assurances, this case comes very close 
to applying estoppel to a municipality, and this seems likely to have 
occurred because the town procedures were inadequate rather than 
because town officials acted improperly under adequate procedures. 
§17.10. Aesthetic restrictions: Reasonable standards of enforce-
ment. Donoghue v. Prynnwood Corp.1 deals with questions raised 
and left unanswered by Snow v. Van Dam2 and Patrone v. Falcone.3 
In the present case, Prynnwood owned land near a country club which 
it divided into 45 lots, all of which had been sold when this suit 
was brought. Prynnwood retained some adjacent vacant land. Each lot 
sold contained varying restrictions. All contained the common re-
striction that "[Prynnwood] must approve all finished plans of [the] 
buyer's proposed home .... "4 Most of the other deeds, but not Dono-
ghue's, also contained the provision that Prynnwood "'reserves the 
right to amend these restrictions from time to time and ... the right 
to waive compliance with these restrictions in any instance.' "5 
At the time of the sale, May 2, 1965, Donoghue was informed by 
one McCullough, an agent for the corporation, that Prynnwood would 
prefer a one-story house so that other homes would have an unim-
paired view of the country club. Donoghue presented McCullough 
with a rough penciled sketch of his proposed house. No objection was 
made by McCullough nor by Munson, Prynnwood's sole stockholder, 
when the plan was given to him with Donoghue's deposit.6 
15 G.L., c. 41, §81A. In 1926 the town created a planning board, but there is 
no indication that it ever performed any functions which would affect this case. 
Furthermore, various exhibits indicate that Marblehead has not yet accepted the 
provisions of the Subdivision Control Law, despite the fact that its population 
exceeded 10,000 in 1953. 
§17.10. 11970 Mass. Adv. Sh. 161, 255 N.E.2d 326. 
2 291 Mass. 477, 197 N.E. 224 (1935). 
3 345 Mass. 659, 189 N.E.2d 228 (1963), noted in 1963 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §1.8. 
4 1970 Mass. Adv. Sh. 161, 162 n.2., 255 N.E.2d 326, 328 n.2. 
5 Id. at 162, 255 N.E.2d at 328. 
6 The evidence is conflicting here, with Donoghue and McCullough testifying as 
14
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Donoghue then employed a prominent architect who designed 
a modern, one-story, flat-roofed house costing in the vicinity of 
$130,000. Munson refused to approve these plans, primarily because 
of his objections to a flat roof. Donoghue and Munson had several 
meetings in an attempt to resolve the impasse, but Munson persisted 
in his refusal to approve the plans. On December 30, 1965, Donoghue 
sought declaratory relief in probate court, asking that Munson be 
ordered to approve the plans as submitted, claiming his refusal to 
do so was arbitrary, capricious, and in bad faith. Munson filed a 
general denial to the allegations and further stated that Donoghue 
bought with knowledge of the restriction and should be estopped to 
deny its validity. Munson also demurred on the ground that there 
had not been a joinder of the other lot owners as necessary parties. 
The probate judge made findings of fact and reserved and reported 
the case to the Supreme Judicial Court without decision.7 
In considering the case, the Supreme Judicial Court first considered 
the nonjoinder issue and focused on the fact that Munson had 
testified that he would have approved Donoghue's plans had it not 
been for the objections of neighbors.8 Consequently, the question 
was whether the neighbors had standing to enforce the restrictive 
covenant. According to Snow v. Van Dam- the leading case in this 
area - they would have standing if there was evidence of a common 
building scheme established before the lots were sold. 9 Since there 
was no evidence showing the existence of a common building scheme,lO 
the Supreme Judicial Court found that a restrictive covenant, ab-
sent a common building scheme, is enforceable only by the grantor. 
This finding is supported by Patrone v. Falcone, a similar case in 
which neighboring lot owners were held to have no standing to sue 
despite a provision in the deed stating that the restriction was for 
the benefit of the other lot owners. A partial basis for this decision 
was the fact that "[e]lsewhere it has been held that a reservation by a 
common grantor of general power to release the restrictions on a 
particular lot negatives the intention to establish a common 
scheme."11 This reservation was present in Donoghue since there were 
several visible exceptions to a common building scheme, such as two 
houses "which might be classified as modern." Consequently, the 
finding of no common building scheme seems fully justifiable. 
The Supreme Judicial Court next considered the question of 
to the existence of the sketch (Record at 31) and Munson denying that he had 
ever seen it (Record at 3, 26). Nonetheless, the Supreme Judicial Court found that: 
"From the reported evidence, however, we ourselves could draw the inference that 
McCullough did in fact show the sketch to Munson." 1970 Mass. Adv. Sh. 161, 162 
n.3, 255 N.E.2d 326, 328 n.3. 
7 G.L., c. 215, §13. 
8 Record at 26, 29. 
9 291 Mass. 477, 483, 197 N.E.2d 224, 227 (1935). 
10 1970 Mass. Adv. Sh. 161, 163, 255 N.E.2d 326, 329. 
11 345 Mass. 659, 662, 189 N.E.2d 228, 230, (1963). 
15
Huber: Chapter 17: Land Use Law
Published by Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School, 1970
§17.10 LAND USE LAW 469 
whether Prynnwood could enforce the restriction using no particular 
objective standard other than whim and aesthetic taste. In general, 
an equitable provision containing a restrictive element is strictly 
interpreted in favor of limiting the restriction. For example, in Hem-
enway v. Bartevian12 a restriction was not enforced when there was 
some doubt about its application to the situation. "If the question 
can be said to be doubtful, then it is a doubt which should be 
'resolved in favor of the freedom of land from servitude.' "13 If ·a 
restriction is exercised reasonably, it will be enforced. In Parsons v. 
Duryea,14 the conveyor refused to authorize a building plan, which 
refusal the buyer disregarded. A temporary restraining order was 
issued after the defendant had spent $200. The Supreme Judicial 
Court affirmed, stating: "The restrictions in question do not prevent 
the owner from conveying the property or impose any unlawful re-
straint of trade. They affect only its mode of use and must be held 
to be valid.''15 1£, on the other hand, a restriction is sought to be en-
forced unreasonably and arbitrarily, quite possibly enforcement will 
be denied.16 
All of these decisions are basically consistent; the ultimate decision 
rests upon whether there is any real basis for withholding approval. 
In Donoghue, "[t]he trial judge's findings go far to show Munson's 
conduct to have been arbitrary."17 There were two other "modern" 
houses in the development; the proposed house would not be econ-
omically detrimental to the neighborhood; and Munson would actually 
have approved but for the objections of the neighbors.18 The Supreme 
Judicial Court also noted that similar covenants had not been en-
forced against others. 
Consequently, a final decree was ordered, declaring that: (I) Prynn-
wood had refused approval of Donoghue's plans unreasonably; (2) 
such approval was no longer required; and (3) Prynnwood was not 
entitled to either injunctive relief or damages. 
This decision was reached despite Donoghue's having proceeded 
with his building plan before he had received approval. This action 
may have been justified, according to the Court, because of Prynn-
wood's unreasonable refusal and because of the denial of a preliminary 
injunction against further construction by Donoghue.19 Although, 
as noted above, the Supreme Judicial Court has respected the use 
12 321 Mass. 226, 72 N.E.2d 536 (1947). 
13 Id. at 229, 72 N.E.2d at 538. 
14 261 Mass. 314, 158 N.E. 761 (1927). 
111 Id. at 316, 158 N.E. at 762. 
16 See Nassif v. Boston &: Maine R.R., 340 Mass. 557, 566, 165 N.E.2d 397, 402 
(1960). 
171970 Mass. Adv. Sh. 161, 164, 255 N.E.2d 326, 329. 
18 Record at 4. 
191970 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 163 n.41, 255 N.E.2d at !128 n.4. 
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of covenants appurtenant to land,2o basic equity principles must be 
observed: '· 
But it is very clear that a suit in equity to compel a compliance 
with such ... [restrictions] concerning the use of property must 
be reasonably commenced, before the persons in possession of the 
estate have expended money or incurred liabilities in erecting 
buildings or other structures on the premises. It would be con-
trary to equity and good conscience to suffer a party to lie by and 
see acts done involving risk and expense by others, and then per-
mit him to enforce his rights and thereby inflict loss and dam-
ages on parties acting in good faith. In such cases, a prompt 
assertion of right is essential to a just claim for relief in equity.21 
Aesthetics and beauty, imposed as in the present case by covenant 
or in some other situations by statute, create difficult interpretive prob-
lems. The questions presented by the instant case could have been 
solved by a doctrine that avoided the justification or rejection of an 
aesthetic judgment solely on aesthetic grounds. It is interesting to 
speculate whether Munson's decision could have been supported upon 
somewhat different and purely beauty-oriented grounds- or if it 
should have been. In effect, aesthetic judgments are personal, and 
Donoghue's use of a noted architect may not necessarily have pre-
vented the aesthetic judgment from going against him. 
§17.11. Variances: Standards and constitutional issues. By this 
time in the history of the Commonwealth, it is quite obvious that 
the Supreme Judicial Court demands full compliance with the Zon-
ing Enabling Act provisions governing the grant of a variance.1 The 
Court, during the 1970 SuRVEY year, construed the Boston Zoning 
Code to the same effect in McNeely v. Board of Appea.l of Boston.2 
Suffolk University was granted a variance to build a five-story class-
room building on a lot in a zone with a permitted floor space to lot 
area ratio of 2 to I, and certain parking, loading and front yard re-
quirements. The floor to lot ratio of the proposed building was less 
than 6.3 to 1. Other requirements had also not been met. The board 
gave no reasons for its approval except to state that relief from the 
loading bay requirement was appropriate because the building would 
require only light deliveries. The variance was upheld by the Superior 
Court. 
The Supreme Judicial Court reversed. It first stated the require-
ments for the grant of a variance and then held that compliance was 
lacking as to each one. The conditions affecting this land were not 
20See generally Snow v. Van Dam, 291 Mass. 477, 197 N.E. 224 (1935). 
21 Whitney v. Union Ry., 77 Mass. (11 Gray) 359, ll67 (1858). 
§17.11. 1 G.L., c. 40A, §15. See discussion in 1969 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §14.7; 
1968 id. §12.5; 1967 id. §11.1; 1964 id §14.3; 1962 id; §13.2; 1959 id.. §12~1; 1958 id. 
§14.9. 
2 970 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1201, 261 N.E.2d !136. 
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different from those affecting other land in the vicinity, and the "im-
pelling need" of Suffolk had nothing to do with the locus but with 
the overcrowded conditions of its other facilities. Hardship was solely 
financial, and that had been created by the cost per student of build-
ing a conforming building in place of the proposed nonconforming 
one. The finding that the variance would not derogate from the in-
terest and purpose of the zoning code was overturned upon unrefuted 
evidence that the purpose of the zone regulations was to help preserve 
the historic Beacon Hill district, upon which the lot in question bor-
dered. 
The Court found that the decision of the board was invalid for 
other reasons as well. The board did not make the explicit findings 
required for the granting of a variance, and the mere restatement of 
.the statutory conditions was insufficient.3 On both this issue and the 
issue of the grounds for granting a variance, no new law was con-
sidered; the Court merely made it clear that a decision under the 
Boston Zoning Code must comply with the same standards as im-
posed by the Zoning Enabling Act. 
The difficult and unique issues of this case relate to the constitu-
tional arguments maintained by Suffolk. The arguments are interest-
ing and complex. Suffolk first argued that Mass. Const. pt. II, c. 5, §2,4 
which imposes upon the General Court the duty of supporting schools 
and educational institutions, rendered unconstitutional any applica-
tion of zoning regulations to the university. The Supreme Judicial 
Court rejected the argument, fiinding the constitutional language 
hortatory and hence not directive upon the legislature. It also noted 
that Article 60 of the Amendments to the Constitution authorized 
zoning without any indication that protection was to be given edu-
cational institutions. 
Suffolk also claimed that it had been denied equal protection of the 
law because the provision in the general Zoning Enabling Act that 
forbids the adoption of zoning regulations prohibiting or interfering 
3 Cases in this area are legion. See Barnhart v. Board of Appeals of Scituate, 343 
Mass. 455, 179 N.E.2d 251 (1962), and the numerous cases cited therein. See also 
1962 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law 13.2. 
4 This section reads as follows: "Wisdom, and knowledge, as well as virtue, 
diffused generally among the body of the people, being necessary for the preserva-
tion of their rights and liberties; and as these depend on spreading the oppor-
tunities and advantages of education in the various parts of the country, and 
among the different orders of the people, it shall be the duty of legislatures and 
magistrates, in all future periods of this commonwealth, to cherish the interests 
of literature and the sciences, and all seminaries of them; especially the university 
at Cambridge, public schools and grammar schools in the town; to encourage 
private societies and public institutions, rewards and immunities, for the promo-
tion of agriculture, arts, sciences, commerce, trades, manufacturers, and a national 
history of the country; to countenance and inculcate the principles of humanity 
and general benevolence, public and private charity, industry and frugality, 
honesty and punctuality in their dealings; sincerity, good humour, and all social 
affections, and generous sentiments among the people.'' : . 
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with the use of land for educational purposes5 was not included in 
the Boston Zoning Code. The Court rejected this argument, noting 
that Boston is often treated specially by the legislature.6 The Court 
found that the omission of this exception from the Boston regulations 
represented a delegation of reasonable contract in the city where 
land use is most intense, population most dense, and :land use by 
educational, religious, and other institutions most pe1vasive. The 
Court also noted that this argument was not apposite, since the Bos-
ton zoning regulations for the district involved did not in any way 
restrict educational use. Unlike those in Sisters of the Holy Cross v. 
Town of Brookline/ the normal regulations of this district did not 
operate in a way that prejudiced reasonable educational use. 
During the 1970 SuRVEY year the Court decided another Boston 
Zoning Code variances case, Wolfson v. Sun Oil Co.s The Boston 
Board of Appeals granted an extension of a nonconforming use and 
a variance to a locus purchased some years after the defendant oil 
company had used the adjoining land for a gasoline station. Again, 
as in McNeely, the board's decision was invalid on its face because 
of its failure to make findings supporting the grant of the variance 
and its mere repetition of the statutory language. The Court also 
found that no hardship in the statutory sense existed, since the bur-
den related not to the locus but to Sun's economic disadvantage in 
not being able to expand its station. 
The two cases noted above illustrate the Court's continuing strict 
interpretation of the statutory provisions governing the grant of vari-
ances. The policy underlying this attitude can be fully rationalized 
particularly now when the special permit device offers a much more 
controlled and better-planned way of modifying zonin!~ regulations. 
In too many jurisdictions the variance has been exercised irrespon-
sibly and without regard for the planning and developmental needs of 
a community. Since flexibility is now attainable by other methods of 
varying zoning, the variance must properly be kept to its narrow 
sphere of operation. 
§17.12. Zoning procedure: Defects that are jurisdictional. The 
Supreme Judicial Court has at various times considered whether or 
not defects in following the appeal procedures under G.L., c. 40A, §21, 
are jurisdictional. Thus, in both Littcoln v. Board of Appeals of Fram-
5 G.L., c. 40A, §2. 
6 The Court discussed Opinion of the Justices, 341 Mass. 760, 168 N.E.2d 858 
(1960) (upholding special urban renewal and planning legislation for Boston), 
noted in 1961 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §12.5, 1960 id. §§10.2, 13.8; and Begley v. 
Board of Appeal of Boston, 349 Mass. 458, 208 N.E.2d 799 (1965) (upholding a 
unique requirement that bond be posted before an appeal be aUowed for grant 
of a variance in Boston), noted in 1965 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §§11.10, 14.3. 
7 347 Mass. 486, 198 N.E.2d 624 (1964), noted in 1965 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §14.13, 
1964 id. §§11.6,.14.5. 
8 1970 Mass. Adv. Sh. 315, 256 N,E.2d 308. 
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ingham1 and Maria v. Board of Appeal of Lowell,2 failure to give 
notice to the town or city clerk of the entry of a bill was fatal, and 
the Superior Court had no jurisdiction of the appeal. But, as the Court 
noted in Bearce v. Zoning Board of Appeals of Brockton,s the plead-
ing of the notice was not the critical element; it was the actual giving 
of the notice that went to the jurisdiction. 
The concept of substance over form underlies the opinion in 
Shaughnessy v. Board of Appeals of Lexington,4 decided during 
the 1970 SuRvEY year. At the trial, the judge elicited the fact that the 
affidavit which the petitioners were required to file under Section 21 
had not been filed within the 21 days prescribed from the date of 
entry of the bill. The next sentence in the statute reads: "If no such 
affidavit is filed within such time the bill shall be dismissed." Reading 
this sentence as imposing a jurisdictional requirement, the trial 
judge dismissed the bill. The Supreme Judicial Court reversed this 
decree and ordered trial of the issues on the merits. The Court noted 
that the giving of the proper notice within the prescribed time to 
those who are the proper defendants was jurisdictional. The actual 
notice is jurisdictional, but the filing of the affidavit merely acts as an 
affirmation that these essential acts were done. The affidavit is thus not 
jurisdictional in itself. When the essential jurisdictional acts are com-
pleted within the prescribed periods, the filing of the affidavit some-
what late should not nullify the effect of the essential acts. The 
Court did note that the failure to file the affidavit within the pre-
scribed time was the omission of an important act that could be 
"critical" but not "necessarily fatal." Thus it would be mandatory to 
show prejudice because of the nontimely filing of the affidavit before 
the bill would be dismissed on this ground. 
As the Court noted in its opinion, the substantial jurisdictional 
issues cannot be divorced from Section 21, but the section should be 
carefully construed so that only those failures that relate to essential 
items should bar the bill. No procedural bars, reminiscent of early 
pleading cases, should be interposed without a positive showing of 
legislative intent. The present case, had the affidavit provision been 
held to be jurisdictional, would have expressed an undesirable domi-
nance of form over function. However, no one should expose himself 
to the risk that this failure might be, if not "fatal," sufficiently "criti-
cal" to bar the substantial relief sought upon the facts of his particular 
case. 
§17.13. Zoning procedure: Notice of proposed hearing and juris-
diction. In Planning Board of Peabody v. Board of Appeals of Pea-
§17.12. 1 346 Mass. 418, 193 N.E.2d 590 (1963), noted in 1964 Ann. Surv. Mass. 
Law §14.4. 
2 348 Mass. 798, 206 N.E.2d 94 (1965), noted in 1965 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §14.16. 
3 351 Mass. 316, 219 N.E.2d 15 (1966), noted in 1966 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §§15.12, 
15.16. . 
4 1970 Mass. Adv. Sh. 183, 255 N.E.2d 367. 
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body,! one Trager was given a special permit by the board of appeals 
to remove fill and gravel from a particular piece of property. The 
planning board's appeal was rejected by the Superior Court but 
sustained by the Supreme Judicial Court. The question concerned the 
notice given under Section 17 of the Zoning Enabling Act2 of the 
hearing before the board of appeals on the petition for the permit. No 
question arose concerning the published notice, but Section 17 also 
requires that the board of appeals "send notice by mail, postage pre-
paid, to the petitioner and to the owners of all property deemed by 
the board to be affected thereby ... and to the planning board .... " 
In this case a member of the board of appeals obtained the names of 
the abutting property owners and gave the list to the petitioner's at-
torney, who sent out the notices. The Supreme Judicial Court found 
the notice was not sufficient to give the board of appeals jurisdiction to 
hear the petition. The duty of the board itself to mail the notices was 
nondelegable, and failure to comply made the board'> decision in-
valid. 
Notice to those affected is, under the Zoning Enabling Act, essen-
tial before rights in land can be affected. The Court has construed 
this to require precise and exact compliance with the statute in order 
to assure that no administratively more facile but perhaps less effec-
tive procedure be used. Local authorities have often depended upon 
those seeking to obtain some permit or license to carry the cost and 
responsibility of sending out necessary notices and taking other 
action on behalf of the official. The present case is at leas1: a warning to 
those involved in zoning that the rather informal methods occasion-
ally used in the past will have to cease. 
§.17.14. Zoning procedure: Proposed use described i[n notice. In 
Fish v. Building Inspector of Falmouth1 the notice of a hearing de-
scribed the purpose for which a permit was sought as being for a "mix-
ing, hatching, and processing plant." The permit was granted but, 
after the appeal period had expired, the board of appe2Js allowed an 
amendment seeking permission to "construct and install a stone 
crushing plant." The Supreme Judicial Court, in a rescript opinion, 
found the original notice not sufficiently broad, specific or informa-
tive to permit the additional use sought after the amendment. This 
aspect of the opinion emphasizes the necessity of an adequate and 
sufficiently detailed notice to assure that the permission granted will 
not be later declared invalid. 
§17.15. Zoning procedure: Detailed record of proceedings. Gen-
eral Laws, c. 40A, §18, requires local boards of appeal to keep a de-
tailed record of their proceedings reflecting their voting record and 
§17.13. 11970 Mass. Adv. Sh. II85, 260 N.E.2d 738. 
2 G.L., c. 40A. 
§17.14. 11970 Mass. Adv. Sh. 837, 258 N.E.2d 743. 
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setting forth reasons for their decisions. The Wellesley zoning by-law 
relating to special permits prescribes that no permit be granted 
without a written finding (to be filed with the board's records) that 
certain conditions will obtain. Under the statute and by-law mandates, 
the board adopted as a rule the requirements that the clerk take 
notes on information stated and that at the executive session he 
record the exact vote of the members and the reasons for granting or 
refusing a permit. These records are to be incorporated into the 
board's decisions. 
In Zartarian v. Minkin 1 the board granted the defendants a permit 
to build a convalescent and nursing home in a residential district, 
making the findings required by the Wellesley by-law. Evidence 
indicated, however, that no executive session was held by the board; 
and the members, after reserving their decisions at the public hearing, 
later telephoned the clerk to record their votes in favor of granting 
the petition. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the judgment 
below, namely, that the defects in the procedure did not invalidate 
the action of the board. The decision substantially complied with 
the town by-law, and the disregarded procedure was treated by the 
Court as internal and "waivable" by the board. The Court did, how-
ever, note that the failure to use the formal, prescribed procedure 
raised uncertainties and invited litigation, implying that a board's 
compliance with its own rules is to be recommended. 
Several other contentions raised by the plaintiffs (nearby property 
owners) related to the legality of conditions imposed by the board 
on the defendant's use of the property for the permitted purposes. 
The Court found that these conditions merely made the permit sub-
ject to termination for noncompliance. They were held not to create 
the type of condition that would cause a purported grant to be merely 
an advisory opinion. Thus the rule of Weld v. Board of Appeals of 
GloucesterJ2 to the effect that a board cannot grant a permit con-
ditional on a subsequent determination, was not controlling. Despite 
some criticism, the difference between grants subject to divestment 
and conditional grants is well established in law. The instant case 
and the Weld decision were differentiated accordingly. Certainly, also, 
as a matter of the most repeated land use planning doctrine, applica-
tion of Weld should be limited to cases having similarly unusual 
sets of facts. The need for greater implementation of the special per-
mit device, combined with the need for conditions to be imposed on 
such grants, strongly suggests that any doctrine limiting the effective 
application of the device should be applied only in extraordinary 
situations. 
§17.15. 11970 Mass. Adv. Sh. 189, 255 N.E.2d 362. 
2 345 Mass. 376, 187 N.E.2d 854 (1963), noted in 1963 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §§12.4, 
13.4. 
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§17.16. Definition of lot. In Miller v. Board of Appeals of Brook-
line1 a special permit for a nonresident parking area on lots numbered 
two through four was granted to one Nordbloom and others who were 
trustees for Pelham Hall, an apartment hotel. The zoning by-law re-
quires that a nonresident parking area must abut or be across the 
street from a nonresidence district, and the plaintiffs argued that 
only a small area of the locus so qualified. In support of their argu-
ment, the plaintiffs contended that since the locus was divided into 
three lots before purchase by Nordbloom, the special permit for 
nonresident parking should be limited to that ten-foot segment of 
the tract that was directly across the street from the bminess district. 
The rest of the property faced a residential area. The trial judge 
found the entire locus to be across the street from a nonresidence 
district. This finding was affirmed by the Supreme Judicial Court, 
which rejected the plaintiffs' argument that the locus should be 
divided into three original lots. The Court quoted the concluding 
sentence of §2.17 of the Brookline by-law, which reads: "A lot for 
the purpose of this [b]y-law may or may not coincide with a lot of 
record." Consequently the zoning by-law was held not to require that 
the board treat the one locus as three separate lots. This holding 
comports with the fairly clear intent of the zoning by-laws, and is 
consistent with cases holding that lots originally sepa:rate but now 
held under single ownership can be treated as a single lot.2 
§17.17. Zoning and earth removal: Statutory interpretation. 
Goodwin v. Board of Selectmen of Hopkinton1 involved a possible 
conflict between an earth removal by-law authorized under G.L., c. 
40, §21 (17), and a zoning by-law authorized under G.L., c. 40A. Both 
by-laws were adopted at the same town meeting by separate votes. The 
petitioners sought a writ of mandamus ordering the selectmen to revoke 
the earth removal permit issued to Pyne Sand & Stone Co. They 
contended that since the zoning by-law does not allow earth removal 
as a permitted use- either as of right or by special permit- and 
since the earth removal by-law states that nothing therein "shall be 
deemed to amend, repeal or supersede the Zoning By-Law,"2 the 
permit was invalidly issued by the board of selectmen. The re-
spondents countered that the earth removal operations did not violate 
the zoning by-law which expressly provides that "[e]arth removal 
shall be permitted only in accordance with the Earth-Removal By-
§17.16. 1 1970 Mass. Adv. Sh. 109, 255 N.E.2d 365. 
2 Vassalotti v. Board of Appeals of Sudbury, 348 Mass. 658, 204 N.E.2d 924 
(1965), noted in 1965 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §14.5; Chater v. Board of Appeals of 
Milton, 348 Mass. 237, 202 N.E.2d 805 (1964), noted in 1965 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law 
§14.12; Vetter v. Zoning Board of Appeal of Attleboro, 330 Mass. 628, 116 N.E.2d 
277 (1953), noted in 1954 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §1.4. 
§17.17. 11970 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1277, 261 N.E.2d 60. 
2 Id. at 1279, 261 N.E.2d at 62. 
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Law,"3 and that the earth removal by-laws apply "to all areas re-
gardless of zoning district."4 
The trial judge and the Supreme Judicial Court agreed with the 
respondents, primarily on the basis that the petitioners' argument 
would render the relevant portions of both by-laws nugatory and 
would forbid earth removal under any circumstances. While the 
Court felt that "[t]he language of both by-laws could have more 
precisely defined their intended relationship," 5 it found that the 
two were not mutually exclusive: 
... A municipality may properly desire to have two separate 
ordinances or by-laws to avoid the involved and strict procedural 
requirements for adopting or amending zoning ordinances and 
by-laws .... While G.L. c. 40, §21(17), is available to munici-
palities which have no zoning ordinances or by-laws, it is equally 
available to other municipalities.6 
The result in this case is eminently sensible if it is assumed that one 
by-law adopted at a town meeting was not meant to amend or re-
peal another adopted at the same meeting. The problem was one 
of unartful language in the by-laws, a not uncommon if hardly ex-
cusable phenomenon. As the Court noted, the language used to co-
ordinate the two by-laws did raise interpretive problems, but separate 
by-laws for the two subjects were reasonable. 
§17.18. Public housing as permitted use: Unreasonable classifica-
tion. General Laws, c. 40A, §2, requires, inter alia, that zoning regu-
lations and restrictions be uniform as to types of buildings and kinds 
of use within each zoning district. A problem of improper classifica-
tion arose during the 1970 SuRvEY year in Cameron v. Zoning Agent 
of Bellingham.1 Under the zoning by-law as amended in 1968 and 
1969, multi-family housing was permitted in the town but only in 
districts that would be created by amendment to the zoning map by 
the town meeting. In a rather confused footnote to the by-law, 
public housing was exempted from the provisions on multi-family 
housing and was permitted under the by-law in all use districts ex-
cept industrial. 
The defendant zoning agent had granted a permit to build a 64-unit 
public housing complex for the elderly. The present action was a 
petition for a writ of mandamus to enforce the zoning by-law and 
revoke the permit. The petitioner contended that the distinction 
made between public housing and other multi-family housing was 
inherently discriminatory in that it based the use of land upon its 
3 Id. at 1278, 261 N.E.2d at 61. 
4 Id. at 1279, 261 N.E.2d at 62. 
5 Id. at 1281, 261 N.E.2d at 63. 
6 Id. at 1282-1283, 261 N.E.2d at 64. 
§17.18. 11970 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1081, 260 N.E.2d 143. 
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ownership and not in accordance with uniform regulations for each 
type and class of building. 
The Supreme Judicial Court noted that legislative bodies "have 
wide powers of classification based upon reasonable differences in 
facts underlying the several classifications."2 It pointed out that 
public housing authorities are public instrumentalities carrying out 
public functions, supported in part by public funds and subject to an 
intensive statutory scheme of regulation, all factors that are not true 
of multi-family housing of other types. The Court thus :found, on the 
evidence of this record, that separate treatment of public housing 
and private multi-family housing was appropriate. Hence the classifi-
cation was not unreasonable. 
The care with which the Court noted that the classification was 
valid on the facts before it certainly suggests that on other facts it 
might reach a different conclusion. It would not appear likely, how-
ever, that such facts would exist where differing classification of these 
two types of multi-family housing was not possible. The reverse 
question is also an interesting one- whether public housing can be 
kept out of a community by the use of zoning regulations restricting 
all multi-family buildings and uses. Pressures for such housing are 
indeed great, and it is arguable that such a restriction could be invalid 
as a denial of equal protection. The new so-called Anti-Snob Zoning 
Law, discussed in Chapter 18 of this SURVEY, represent:; a legislative 
response to the compelling need for low and moderate income hous-
ing in some areas of the state. The question exists whether, even 
absent these conditions, a court might not find that restrictions on 
multi-family housing, particularly the less expensive type, are un-
constitutional. 
B. EMINENT DOMAIN 
§17.19. Public utilities: Local .and state control of routes. Boston 
Edison Co. v. Town of Sudbury1 is the latest of a long line of cases 
dealing with the construction of an overhead electrical transmission 
line. The first Sudbury case2 had held that under G.L., c. 164, §72, a 
petition for authority to construct a transmission line must be filed 
with the Department of Public Utilities, which could authorize 
construction based on public convenience and necessity. The utility 
must also, under this case, file a subsequent petition for authority to 
take by eminent domain if necessary. The case also held that each 
separate determination of the department is a final and appealable 
2 Id. at 1085, 260 N.E.2d at 146. 
§17.19. 1 356 Mass. 406, 253 N.E.2d 850 (1969). 
2 Town of Sudbury v. Department of Public Utils., 343 Mass. 428.. 179 N.E.2d 263 
(1962), noted in 1962 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §15.2. 
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order. The second Sudbury case3 was basically a reaffirmation of the 
first, granting authority in a subsequent eminent domain proceeding. 
In Boston Edison Co. v. Board of Selectmen of Concord4 the Court 
held that it was within the authority of the local board of selectmen 
to deny Edison's petitions for street crossing locations under G.L., c. 
166, §§21, 22 and 28, even if such denial were based solely on 
aesthetic considerations. In Town of Framingham v. Department of 
Public Utilities,5 on the other hand, the Court held that a proceeding 
under G.L., c. 40A, §10, could exempt Edison from the local zoning 
laws independently of a proceeding under G.L., c. 164, §72, such as 
was involved in the Sudbury cases. 
In the present case, Edison sought declaratory relief against local 
building inspectors, and several towns sought declaratory relief against 
Edison. The litigation was consolidated in the Superior Court, where 
the building inspectors were enjoined from enforcing their towns' 
building codes and the application to enjoin further construction by 
Edison was denied. Subsequently a single Justice of the Supreme Ju-
dicial Court enjoined further construction. 
In resolving these conflicts, and, no doubt, hoping to put an end 
to this entire line of litigation, the Supreme Judicial Court filed a 
lengthy opinion which held: (l) G.L., c. 164, §72, requires approval 
for the proposed transmission line from the Department of Public 
Utilities (despite Justice Reardon's expression to the contrary in the 
Framingham case6); (2) the local building codes must give way in this 
type of case to statewide enforcement by the department under G.L., 
c. 166, §27, for the sake of uniformity; (3) Edison was not relieved of 
the necessity to secure street crossing locations under G.L., c. 166, 
§§21, 22, 27 and 28, despite the fact that it had already acquired most 
of the other necessary easements, and despite the fact that they might 
never obtain such approval; (4) the injunction against further con-
struction was dissolved, leaving Edison free to proceed with such con-
struction at the risk of later disapproval under G.L., c. 166. The 
Court felt that the approval requirements were a problem for the 
legislature to resolve, since the present statute clearly mandated the 
conclusion reached by the Court. 
The complexities underlying adequate statutory interpretation are 
well illustrated by the agility and balancing by which the Court 
settled very difficult questions. The opinion cannot fairly be faulted 
on this issue, and the Court's wending of its way through complex 
and indefinite legislative history is a fascinating performance by a 
master in this art. One might suggest that the combination of intricate 
legislation and scant legislative history- and an ofttimes minimal 
3 Town of Sudbury v. Department of Public Utils., 351 Mass. 214, 218 N.E.2d 
415 (1966), noted in 1966 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §17.1. 
4 355 Mass. 79, 242 N.E.2d 868 (1968), noted in 1969 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §11.3. 
5 355 Mass. 138, 244 N.E.2d 281 (1969). 
6ld. 
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effort by the General Court to relate amendments and additions to 
the parent legislation- has compelled the development of the Court's 
talent. On the substance of the decision, even if one disagrees with 
some of the conclusions as a matter of policy, the Court properly 
leaves the issues to the General Court. It will be interesting to see 
the legislative result if action by the towns results in denial of the 
crossing permit needed by Edison to complete the proposed line. 
Aesthetics has become in many ways a critical issue with the public, 
and the success of the Storm King litigation has encouraged citizen 
groups to attack the grant of easements to utilities that create aes-
thetic as well as safety hazards. 
§17.20. Property already in public use. The Supreme Judicial 
Court has, at least since the leading case of Higginson v. Treasurer and 
School House Commissioners of Boston,1 consistently held that land 
appropriated to one public use cannot be diverted to another incon-
sistent use without the authority being plainly and precisely stated.2 
Despite this well-known rule, however, cases continue to come before 
the Court on these issues, the principal problem naturally being 
whether the authority of the agency seeking to take the property 
meets the tests of explicitness and precision. 
In Town of Brookline v. Metropolitan District Commission} the 
town held parkland that the commission sought to take for widening 
and improvement of the roads presently passing through the park-
land. The Court determined that the legislation authorizing the com-
mission to take land was not sufficiently specific as to this tract. The 
same conclusion was reached in Abbott v. Commissioners of the 
County of Dukes County.4 In Abbot the owners of land near the 
county airport succeeded in an action of mandamus in preventing 
the commissioners from acquiring land or easements within the state 
forest adjoining the airport. 
The cases in this area are numerous and generally reconciliable. 
Presumably they arise because much legislation permits, in general 
terms, the taking of property in one public use for another use, but 
does not state explicitly what specific property can be taken. Legisla-
tion tends to be drafted in general terms, and the General Court has 
not yet responded- nor been requested to respond- to the need for 
specificity in this area. It can also be presumed that some public 
agencies do not object to the taking of some of their land for other 
public purposes, even if such taking was not originally authorized. It 
can be seen, however, from cases similar to Abbott, that the remedy 
of mandamus and increased public interest in the protection of open 
spaces and parklands will tend to reduce the effect of the acquiescent 
§17.20. 1 212 Mass. 583, 99 N.E. 523 (1912). 
2 See cases noted in 1969 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §14.24; 1967 id. §11.3; 1965 id. 
§14.25; 1963 id. §13.15. 
3 1970 Mass. Adv. Sh. 699, 258 N.E.2d 284. 
4 1970 Mass. Adv. Sh. ll03, 260 N.E.2d 142. 
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public official. Clearly then, either more precise legislation must be 
instigated by agencies seeking to take public land, or a method of 
determining priorities will have to be devised, An administrative 
body could well be developed to consider all public interests in-
volved in such a proposed taking, and to then determine the best 
solution in a particular case. This would provide a much better 
solution than would any attempts to seek enactment of numerous 
statutes describing specific properties that can be taken, where the 
general public inter.ests cannot reasonably be given their due. 
§17.21. Expert testimony: Use for subdivision. In Carlson v. 
Town of Holden 1 the plaintiff sought damages for the taking of 15 
acres of his land by the town for school purposes. He testified . that 
the best use of this tract was for subdivision purposes, although 
he had used it for farming purposes himself, and set its value at 
$75,000. The town in tum called several expert witnesses, one with 
experience in sanitary engineering and the other a sanitary engineer. 
They were asked questions based on percolation tests in which they 
had participated on the tract. Certain questions were excluded by the 
judge, and the present appeal was taken from these exclusions. 
The witness who was a civil engineer with experience in sanitary 
engineering was asked whether he had an opinion, as a result of his 
examination of the test holes, as to the suitability of the area for the 
development of building lots. The question was excluded. The Su-
preme Court upheld this exclusion since the question went beyond 
the competency of the witness; he was not qualified to determine the 
suitability of the lots for residential building. 
The sanitary engineer, however, was asked for an opinion in a 
much more limited area: whether the property where test holes 
were dug was suitable "for the construction of sewer systems for 
individual houses." This was clearly within the competence of the 
witness and bore directly on the issue of the market value of the land. 
The suitability of the land for sewerage systems relates directly to 
the land's present value for subdivision and was evidence that a jury 
could take into account in determining the use to which the land 
could be put. It was therefore found error to exclude the question. 
C. SuBDIVISION CoNTROL 
§.17.22. Right of way: Way designated on plan. Particularly in 
older subdivisions that were not fully developed when laid out and 
have not been since developed, ways designated on the recorded 
plans have never been constructed. Problems derived from this type 
of situation were involved in the case of Uliasz v. Gillette/ decided 
in the 1970 SuRvEY year. In 1913 one Wilbur had a plan recorded for 
§17.21. 1 1970 Mass. Adv. Sh. ll21, 260 N.E.2d 666. 
§17.22. 1 1970 Mass. Adv. Sh. 327, 256 N.E.2d 290. 
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a large tract that he owned in Pittsfield. The easternmost of the north· 
south ways was called Sheffield Street. It was crossed at one location 
by a way called Savoy Street running northwest-southeast. The 
planned portion of Savoy Street that ran eastward from Sheffield was 
never developed, since it lead to undeveloped land in other owner-
ship. Over a period of years, the lots directly. north and south of this 
undeveloped way were purchased by the respondent Gillette. In 1958 
Gillette executed a deed to a straw to that portion of Savoy Street 
abutting her property, claiming title to this land by adverse posses-
sion. The deed of the same date from the straw back to her contained 
no reference to the adverse possession claim. From the date of these 
deeds, the town designated this undeveloped end on Savoy Street as 
a lot and assessed the respondent Gillette for real estate taxes on it. 
In 1962 the petitioners purchased the land abutting the major 
portion (about seven-eighths) of the Savoy Street extension. This land 
was never in common ownership with any land owned or claimed by 
Gillette. The petitioners had access to their land on a public way. They 
brought the present action, a suit in equity under G.L., c. 231A, for 
a declaration that the Savoy Street extension was dedicated to public 
use and that they had the right to travel it between their adjoining 
land and Sheffield Street. The probate court granted the petitioners' re-
quest for the declaration sought, but the decree was reversed by the 
Supreme Judicial Court. 
To reach its result, the Court had to reject a number of contentions 
made by the petitioners. The claim that the petitioners and their 
predecessors had obtained a title by prescription over the lot was not 
supported by sufficient evidence to reach the required open, notorious 
and adverse use for the prescriptive period. The claim of an easement 
of necessity was readily rejected, since such an easement can be found 
only when the properties involved were in common ownership up 
to the time of their division; thus, such a claim is not available to 
strangers to the title. It was also clear that, since the petitioners' 
property had access on a public way, no legal necessity existed for 
access via Savoy Street. 
The petitioners also claimed that the respondent was estopped to 
deny that the lot was "an easement, right of way andfor thoroughfare 
for public use" because all deeds in the respondent's chain of title 
referred to the recorded plan showing the way. The Court noted that 
a grantor who conveys land by recorded plan upon which a street is 
shown is estopped to deny the easement of travel over that street 
for the benefit of the grantee and his successors in title. But, the 
Court noted, in the instant case, this rule protects only the grantee 
and her successors in title, not strangers to the title. The right of way 
is an easement appurtenant, not in gross. The petitioners were 
strangers to the title, owning no land in the subdivision, and therefore 
the respondent was not estopped as to them. 
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The trial judge apparently decided the case on the ground that 
Wilbur, in the recording of his 1913 subdivision, established Savoy 
Street as a right of way, thoroughfare, or private way for public use. 
The Supreme Judicial Court disagreed with this conclusion. The 
portion of Savoy Street in question was never laid out or established 
as a public way nor was it ever treated as such by the city. A public 
way cannot be created by dedication in the Commonwealth,2 although 
under certain circumstances a way not formally accepted could be 
found to be dedicated to public use. Here, however, Wilbur's re-
cording of his plan, and his later conveyances referring to the plan, 
were totally insufficient to create a public way; creation of a public 
way requires unequivocal declarations or acts appropriating land to 
a public use, and surrendering it to the public.3 
A further claim by petitioners was that the respondent's deeds to 
a straw and from the straw back to her were null and void. The 
Court noted that the petitioners had no right to question the title, 
since title can be contested only by the true owner or a person having 
a superior right to possession. In turn, however, the Court did re-
fuse to declare that the respondent was owner of the land in question, 
since there was no indication that all parties entitled to be heard on 
the issues were before the Court. 
The rather extensive summary of the various arguments presented 
is helpful as reviewing and effectively restating what has been basically 
established doctrine in the Commonwealth, but of which many seem 
either forgetful or ignorant. The case does at least serve this valuable 
pedagogical purpose. It also serves as a reminder that there are a 
number of older subdivisions throughout the Commonwealth, and 
that questions concerning various aspects of the original plan will 
naturally develop as conditions change. 
§17.23. Subdivider-provided sewer system: Additional municipal 
charge. Under the legislative pattern adopted in most municipalities, 
part of the cost of the installation of sewer systems is assessed against 
property affected in annual or permanent charges. In Exeter Realty 
Corp. v. Town of Bedford1 the town had elected to impose a perma-
nent charge. Two separate categories of charges were developed in 
the by-law, a $5 per front-foot charge when sewer lines are installed by 
the town and a $2.50 per front foot charge when the sewer lines are 
installed by developers. Exeter's predecessor as developer, Lido, had 
agreed to pay the $2.50 per front foot charge as well as to install the 
sewer system in the subdivision. Exeter, however, refused to pay the 
charge, and the town denied it occupancy permits for the houses 
already built and otherwise fully ready for use. 
Exeter's claim that the town had exceeded its authority was re-
2 G.L., c. 84, §23, codifying St. 1846, c. 203, §I. 
3 Longley v. City of Worcester, 304 Mass. 580, 24 N.E.2d 533 (1939). 
§17.23. 1 356 Mass. 399, 252 N.E.2d 885 (1969). 
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jected by the Supreme Judicial Court. The Court reviewed the 
pertinent parts of certain 1947 and 1952 special acts under which 
the town had acted, which acts referred to G.L., c. 83, §§14-18. 
Sections 14 and 15 make it clear that a town can as~,ess against a 
lot owner not merely a proportional part of the cost of that sewer 
but also a proportional part (so far as not already assessed as better-
ments against other lot owners) of the cost of the main town sewer sys-
tem through which the local sewer serving the lot discharges. Section 
17 reads in part: "[A] town in which ... common sewers are laid may 
determine that a person who uses such . . . common ~,ewers in any 
manner, instead of paying an assessment under section fourteen, shall 
pay for the permanent privilege of his estate such reasonable amount 
as ... selectmen ... shall determine." The reference to Section 14 
makes it clear that Section 17 covers a benefit assessment, not the an-
nual charge alternative authorized by Section 16. The town's by-law 
therefore was enacted under Section 17. 
The Court noted as justifiable the town's by-law assessing the 
permanent rate for the owner of a lot where the subdivider installed 
the sewer system, since the sewer service physically immediate to his 
land was already paid for by the lot owner either directly or indirectly. 
The Court found that the differential was not improper, recognizing 
that it is an estimation but not an unreasonable one. One could cer-
tainly argue that a fairer division of value could have been developed. 
However, the range of legislative discretion is substantial when some-
what differing views of the facts support differing type~; of cost vari-
ables. It would seem improbable, though, for a municipality to 
favor a development bringing new people into the town over owners 
of older, established homes. Under certain circumstances, a charge 
such as this, along with other techniques, could discourage develop-
ment in the assessing community and tend to thrust it into others. 
However, Bedford has not been nearly so exclusionary as some other 
of Boston's suburban communities, and the sewer charge differential 
is thus much less suspect. 
Exeter also argued, on the basis of O'Malley v. Commissioner of 
Public Works of Boston,2 that the $2.50 per front foot charge was 
really a charge for the cost of connecting· a private drain to a main 
sewer system. The Court noted, however, that O'Malley did differenti-
ate between a sewer connection charge and a charge that reflected the 
value added to land by its being joined to the town's general sewer 
system. It held that the present case involved the latter type of charge. 
§17.24. Public way: Prescription. In Town of Boxborough r1. 
]oatham Spring Realty Trust1 the town sought a declaration of the 
2 340 Mass. 542, 165 N.E.2d 113 (1960), noted in 1960 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §§1.9, 
18.7. 
§17.24. 1356 Mass. 487, 253 N.E.2d 335 (1969). 
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rights, if any, of the public to the use of the way running over land 
of the trust. The appellant, owner of land adjoining that of the trust, 
had access to her land over the 1240 foot way in issue. The lower court 
had confirmed a master's report and decreed that no part of the way 
in question was a public way but that a right of way for the benefit 
of the appellant landowner for residential and farming purposes did 
exist across the land of the trust. This decree was affirmed by the 
Supreme Judicial Court. 
Before a way can be found to be established for the benefit of the 
public by prescription, use by the general public as a public right 
must be proven in addition to both the open, notorious, and hostile 
nature of the acts relied upon and the 20-year prescriptive period.2 
On the facts of this case, public use was infrequent and for only such 
limited occasional purposes as visiting a spring, hauling wood from 
back land, or hunting. For over 20 years the town listed the road as 
a public way and performed road maintenance functions thereon. 
The Court noted that evidence of maintenance by the town is at best 
incidental in attempting to prove a public way by dedication; the 
crucial issue involves the extensiveness of the use by the general 
public.3 The Court recognized the doctrine expressed by Justice 
Holmes in Taft v. Commonwealth4 - that frequency of use in 
smaller, less populated communities is best estimated by the nature 
of the area served- but rejected the application on these facts, 
wherein only the appellant and her predecessors in title had with any 
consistency and frequency used the way. 
§17.25. Ownership of land subdivided. Kuklinska v. Planning 
Board of Wakefield1 was one of three companion cases decided in the 
same opinion. A number of issues were involved, but the major sub-
division control issue involved the requirement that the applicant 
for subdivision approval own all the land being subdivided. The 
issue arose because part of the land subdivided was determined to be 
the land of a petitioner. Under G.L., c. 41, §81L, a subdivision appli-
cant is defined as an "owner or his agent." Section 81M requires that 
the planning board adopt "reasonable rules and regulations." The 
town has a rule requiring that the applicant own all the land included 
in the subdivision. Once it was determined that the boundary had 
been improperly determined and that part of the land covered by the 
plan was not owned by the applicant, the board's approval had to 
be annulled. The plan was sent back to the board for action. 
One of the companion cases involved an additional subdivision con-
trol issue. An owner of land abutting the subdivision claimed the 
2 The Court cited Bullukian v. Franklin, 248 Mass. 151, 142 N.E. 804 (1924), for 
this proposition. 
3 Carson v. Brady, 329 Mass. 36, 106 N.E.2d I (1952). 
4 158 Mass. 526, 552, 33 N.E. 1046, 1050 (1893). 
§17.25. 1 1970 Mass. Adv. Sh. 355, 256 N.E.2d 601. 
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plan did not provide, as the board's regulations required, for the pro-
jection of subdivision streets into adjoining property. The defense 
was that the adjoining property of this petitioner had. other ready 
access to public ways, which holding the board had adopted. The 
master below stated that the board had so found, but the Supreme 
Judicial Court noted that the court below (here the master) had to 
make its own finding on this issue and that it was not enough merely 
to repeat the board's determination. 
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